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THE SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW QUARTERLY
REVIEW SECTION
AIRPLANE TORT LAW
GEORGE W. ORR*
Liability for tort growing out of the use of the airplane
sounds as though it would be only of academic interest to
the average lawyer. This, of course, is because aviation is
comparatively new. But this new industry is making great
strides. There are now over 100,000 airplanes registered in
the United States. Only a few years ago our airplanes were
struggling to pass the 1,000,000 passenger mark. Our airlines
carried some 18,828,000 revenue passengers last year.' True,
they have established such a wonderful safety record over
the past several years that only a fraction over one passenger
was fatally injured in each 100,000,000 passenger miles of
flight-making airline safety far greater than driving from
office to home in automobile or taxi.2 But even with such
safety, there are bound to be some accidents. And accidents
produce both claims and law suits. For instance, my office-
representing only one of several aviatiofi insurers-super-
vised the handling of some 2,000 aviation tort claims in 1950
and had 217 suits in the U. S. A. involving aeronautical torts
on our suit register at the end of last year. So the subject has
in fact grown considerably beyond purely academic interest.
Since the aeronautical operations we insure reach around
the globe, I can not attend most trials and use adjusters and
attorneys I have never met to handle claims and law suits.
The principal difficulty I encounter is the fact that most law-
yers have not had aviation practice, therefore know nothing
of aviation law or of aviation. We all fear the unknown. In
*Director of Claims, United States Aircraft Insurance Group, N. Y. Presented to
the Annual Meeting of the South Carolina Bar Association at Greenville, S. C.,
June 8th, 191.
1. Jan 20, 1951 CAA Journal.
2. National Safety Council.
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my office I solve this difficulty by building a staff of lawyers
who are also aviators. We specialize in aviation and aviation
law in order to supply the only gap in the equipment of the
otherwise competent local attorney. In the hope of contribu-
ting something of practical value to the practicing lawyer, I
shall try, within the limited space at my disposal, to accom-
plish somewhat the same result in this paper-so far as the
law is concerned.
Aviation Subject to Common Law Rules of Negligence
The comforting thing to the lawyer is that there is really
little aviation law, in the sense of law peculiar to aviation.
Tort liability has been tinkered with little as yet in connection
with aviation and the common law rules of negligence-with
which every lawyer is familiar-generally apply. There is a
considerable body of law built up by our courts applying these
principles, but an adequate discussion of such cases cannot
be included in a general paper of this character. Although
there have been comparatively few "reported cases" there
have been many decisions, charges and opinions by lower
-courts which indicate the trend in the law. A comprehensive
compilation of most decisions and other pertinent material
is found in U. S. Aviation Reports and the Commerce Clear-
ing House publishes a very comprehensive service called Avia-
tion Law Report.4 The idea I wish to convey is that aviation
law is not a special branch but an application of the general
law with which we are all familiar and quite as accessible as
the law relating to any other industry.
There are three exceptions to this: (1) Land Damage Stat-
utes, (2) Guest Statutes, and (3) The international treaty
covering liability to passengers, baggage and cargo in inter-
national flight known as the Warsaw Convention. These will
be discussed later. Let us first take a look at the way our
courts have applied the well established doctrines of the com-
mon law to a new and revolutionary technological develop-
ment such as aviation or have modified those rules in a
perfect example of the adaptability and flexibility of our
wonderful and unique common law system.
3. U. S. Aviation Reports, Inc., 2301 N. Charles St., Baltimore 18,
Md.
4. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 214 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago
1, Ill.
2
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Cujus Est Solum Modified to Permit Flying
The very first hurdle, of course, was the old common law
doctrine of cujus est solum ejus usque ad coelum-whose is
the soil, his it is up to the sky.5 Literally applied, there could
have been no flight without trespass. There are many deci-
sions on the subject, but the U. S. Supreme Court in U. S. v.
CausbyV6 pretty well sums them up, holding that the above
doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a pub-
lic highway and the air space, apart from the immediate
reaches above the land, is a part of the public domain. How-
ever, the rights of the land owner are fully protected as this
court (and many other courts) held that the land owner
owns at least as much of the space above the ground as he
can occupy or use in. connection with the land. Invasions of
air space are in the same category as invasions of the surface.
Air Carrier Liability Same as Any Common Carrier
The principle that a common carrier is not the insurer of
its passengers' safety is applied to airlines. For instance, in
Allison v. Standcrd Airlines7 the court held that "the carrier
is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not
bound absolutely and at all events to carry them safely." The
operator not in the common carrier class likewise is held to
the same degree of-care as the non carrier operator of a
vehicle on the surface.
The airline, like other common carriers, is held to the
highest degree of care, but this "highest degree" must be in-
terpreted as that consistent with the operation of an airline.
For instance, in Law v. TWA 8 there is a good discussion of
this problem. In Foot v. Nortkwest Airlines9 the court says:
"It was the duty of the defendant to exercise the highest de-
gree of care for the safety of the passengers ..... consist-
ent with the practical operation of the plane itself ..... We
are not to hold people to the impossible."
The airline, of course, is not responsible if the injury oc-
curred from an "Act of God". In Thomas v. American Air-
5. 9 CokeS54.
6. 328 U. S. 256.
7. 1930 USAvR 292.
8. 1931 USAvR 205.
9. 1931 USAvR 60.
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ways10 , for instance, the court charged the jury: "If you be-
lieve .. . that the accident happened without fault or negli-
gence . . . . or as a result of an Act of God, then it is your
duty .... to return your verdict in favor of the defendant."
This principle is still applied as we have, in May, 1951, had
a verdict for the defendant affirmed by the U. S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit" in the case in which the Ex-
ecutrix of the notorious Earl Carroll sued for $2,000,000
damages resulting from an accident in Pennsylvania.
The principle that a passenger must assume the risk of
the mode of conveyance he chooses is applied to aircraft.12
This principle is well stated in the early case of L&WR Co.
v. Crumpler13 " .... but there are some casualties which
human sagacity could not guard against and foresee, and that
every passenger must make up his mind to meet the risks
incident to the mode of travel which he adopts, that cannot
be avoided by the highest degree of care and skill in the prep-
aration and management of the means of conveyance."
The principle that a person is not to be held strictly ac-
countable for decisions made in an emergency has been ap-
plied in aviation cases. For instance, in Thomas v. American,
supra, the court said: "One who, without negligence on his
own part, is suddenly confronted with imminent danger, is
not required to exercise that degree of care and skill which
would be required after a calm review of the facts after an
accident occurred."
Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Aviation
The application of res ipsa loquitur to aviation cases, as
to any other type cases, is not consistent in the various
states. Most of our courts have recognized and applied the
doctrine under certain circumstances, but the conditions un-
der which the courts will apply the doctrine and the method
of application vary almost in proportion to the number of
jurisdictions. 14 South Carolina courts have repudiated the
doctrine but have managed to reach about the same results.
10. 1935 USAvR 102.
11. Schuyler Ex'x. v. United Airlines.
12. Allison v. Standard Airlines, supra; Kimmel v. Pennsylvania Air-
lines, 1937 USAvR 104; Hope v. United Airlines, 1937 USAvR 179;
Law v. Transcontinental Airlines, supra.
13. 122 Fed. 425.
14. WIGMORE, Vol. IX, § 2509.
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1951], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol4/iss2/2
AIRPLANE TORT LAW
The subject is briefly included, nevertheless, as a rather
necessary element of tort law.
The phrase, res ipsa loquitur, translated literally, means
that the thing or affair speaks for itself. It is merely a short
way of saying that the circumstances attending the accident
are such as to justify the conclusion that the accident was
caused by negligence. The inference of negligence is deduc-
ible, not from the mere happening of the accident, but from
the attendant circumstances. 15
The doctrine is not an arbitrary rule "but rather a com-
mon sense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial
evidence. It is a rule of reasonable inferences". 16 So, where a
plaintiff introduces evidence showing at least the probabili-
ty that a particular accident could not have occurred with-
out negligence of the defendant, an inference of negligence
is shown. 17 However, the inference of negligence must be the
only one that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from the
attendant circumstances to permit the application of res ipysa
loquitur.5
Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur
The law requires a plantiff to establish the negligence of
a person from whom he seeks damages, and it must be estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence. 19 We thus say
the plaintiff has the burden of proof or the burden of prov-
ing the defendant's negligence. Let us see then in what way
res ipsa eases the plaintiff's burden of proof.
We know that "practically all courts now recognize the
distinction between the burden of producing evidence-that
is, the risk of non-production of sufficient evidence to justify
a finding-and the burden of persuasion-that is, the risk
of failing to persuade the trier to make that finding-though
many still use the term, burden of proof, to cover both con-
cepts. '20 This division of the burden of proof may also be
15. JACOBS, EVIDENCE IN NEGLIGENCE CASES, 75.
16. 1 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE, § 56 (Zipp's ed. 1941);
see Galbraith v. Busch, 267 N. Y. 230, 234, 196 N. E. 36, 38 (1935).
17. See Loebig's Guardian v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.; 259 Ky. 124,
126, 81 S. W. 2d 910, 911 (1935); Galbraith v. Busch, supra note 16,
at 234, 196 N. E. at 38.
18. Jenson v. Kress & Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 P. 2d 958 (1935); Fran-
cey v. Rutland Ry., 222 N. Y. 482, 119 N. E. 86 (1918); 1 SHEARMAN
AND REDFIELD, cit. supra note 16, § 56.
19. 65 C. J. S. 995 (1950).
20. MORGAN, EVIDENCE 10 (Practicing Law Institute 1946).
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labeled the burden of going forward with the evidence (to
avoid a non-suit), and the burden of persuasion (to convince
the jury and get a verdict). We then ask: Does res ipsa satis-
fy the burden of persuasion or merely the burden of going
forward with the evidence?
The majority view is that res ip'sa loquitur does not estab-
lish a presumption of negligence, but merely raises an infer-
ence of negligence sufficient to establish a prima facie case
and carry the case to the jury.2' Thus, it merely aids the
plaintiff by carrying the burden of going forward with the
evidence, and the plaintiff still must carry the burden of per-
suasion to get a verdict.2la
Too many lawyers have made the mistake of assuming
that this doctrine will be applied to all aviation cases, there-
fore, that a situation approximating presumed liability exists
with respect to aviation accidents. -Nothing could be further
from the truth.
Difference Between Res Ipsa and Presumed Liability
There are three major differences between res ipsa loquitur
and presumed liability:
First, the courts recognize res ipsa loquitur as an excep-
tion to the common law rule that a plaintiff must prove de-
dendant's fault, and as such, they require the plaintiff to jus-
tify the use of the doctrine by showing the aircraft was in
the exclusive control of the defendant, freedom from con-
tributory negligence, and that such accidents do not ordi-
narily occur without negligence. Many courts have refused
to apply res ipsa loquitur in aviation passenger claims be-
cause the plaintiff failed to justify its application. The plain-
tiff is faced with no such problem where liability is pre-
sumed.
Second, res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence which,
according to most courts, creates a mere inference of negli-
gence and the burden of proving negligence by a preponder-
ance of the evidence remains with the plaintiff. However, if
21. SHAIN, RES IPSA LOQUITUR, PRESUMPTIONS AND BURDEN OF PROOF& d ed. 1947); Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttal Presumptions of Law
pon the Burden of Proof, 68 U. oF PA. L. REv. 307 (1920); Reaugh,
Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 36 ILL. L. RE . 703 (1942); 10 Am.
Jur. 374 (1937); 38 Am. Jur. 1008 (1941); 65 C. J. S. 1021 (1950);
Nebel v. Burrelli, 41 A 2d 873.
21a. McLarty, VA. LAW REViEw, Jan. 1951, 55.
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presumed liability were in fact imposed by the doctrine, the
burden of proving freedom of fault, by a preponderance of
evidence, would be squarely placed upon the defendant. In
other words, 'res igsa loquitur merely aids a plaintiff in prov-
ing negligence, but if liability is accepted as presumed, the
plaintiff would be freed from proving anything and all of
the burden would be placed squarely on the defendant.
Finally, the ultimate effect of the two doctrines--res ipsa
loquitur and presumed liability-is quite different. In al-
most every aviation passenger case in which res ipsa has been
invoked, the court or jury has found a verdict for the defend-
ant, whereas incidents are rare, indeed, in which a defend-
ant's verdict is reached when presumed liability is imposed.
For instance, in only one case under the Warsaw Convention,
which imposes presumed liability,22 has a U. S. A. court or
jury found for the defendant. As in all other types of tort
cases, there is no magic formula by which a case can be
won--either for plaintiff or defendant. There is no substitute
for careful preparation.
Evidence in Accidents Where All Aboard Are Killed
This suggests the well known query as to how negligence
can be proven in an airplane accident which occurs in a re-
mote section where there are few eye witnesses, if any, and
everyone on the plane is killed. This presents an unsurmount-
able problem to the theorist, but to those with experience in
such matters, it presents no problem at all. Let's take an
actual airline catastrophe which occurred on an airline my of-
fice represented but for which all claims are now settled and,
therefore, discussion is permissible. On a regularly sched-
uled trip of a certificated airline, a DC-3 airliner crashed into
a mountain some fifty miles from its scheduled destination,
instantly killing all on board-both passengers and crew-
and the country in which the crash occurred was so wild that
there was not a single witness to the accident or the flight
before the accident occurred. It took days to find the wreck
and when found, it was almost completely demolished by im-
pact and fire.
This is the type of accident that the theoretical lawyer feels
is hopeless, either as to proving negligence or defending a suit
22. Ritts v. American Overseas Airlines, 1949 USAvR 65.
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in which the doctrine of 2'es ipsa loquitur is applied. Such
a conclusion is completely unjustified. The fact is that vol-
umes of factual evidence was available in that case as is us-
ually true in any airline catastrophe. The reason is that more
complete records are kept in airline operation than perhaps
in any industry. There are complete records of past perform-
ance of the aircraft and engines. There is a complete record
of all inspections, repairs, and overhauls. There is a complete
record of the training and experience as well as the physical
condition of the crew. There is a complete record of the load-
ing and dispatching of the aircraft, of the weather before
and after the flight was dispatched, with the plan of flight
and all radio conversations during airport control and en
route. There is a complete record of the examination of the
accident site and the wreckage by experts. Furthermore, an
exhaustive public investigation-with both the hearing and
a transcript of the testimony available to plaintiff and de-
fendant alike-brings out all technical and eye witness evi-
dence far better than any private investigation, since the
CAB has the power of subpoena. In what other industry is
so much done for the claimant and his attorney?
In the illustration mentioned, the Civil Aeronautics Board
published the following finding as to the facts and the prob-
able cause :2
"1. The air carrier, the aircraft and the crew were prop-
erly certified.
2. There was no failure or malfunctioning of the aircraft,
engines or radio disclosed in the investigation. Power
was being developed by both engines on impact.
3. The flight experienced light to moderate turbulence.
4. All radio range and air navigational facilities were op-
erating normally with the exception of the Newhall
radio range station which was inoperative.
5. Although the Newhall radio range was inoperative,
adequate radio facilities were available for instrument
flight from Las Vegas to Burbank.
6. Although the flight had reported no difficulty up to the
time of the last radio contact at 0337, static condi-
tions and transmissions of other flights on the com-
23. Docket No. SA-131, File No. 5413-46.
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pany radio frequency made the communications of
Flight 23 difficult.
7. The flight time from 0320 until 0337, was a period of
an unusual amount of radio communication.
8. The winds in the mountainous area were higher than
forecast at the altitude at which the flight was con-
ducted.
9. Other flights had been able to navigate safely through
and about the area of the scene of the accident.
10. The position report 'over Newhall' was in error.
11. The let-down was started without a positive check on
the position.
12. The scene of the accident is located 27 miles northwest
of the intersection of the southwest leg of the Palm-
dale radio range and northwest leg of the Los Angeles
radio range and 10 miles to the right of the radio range
leg on which initial approach let-down was to be made.
13. The aircraft was on an approximate heading of 155
degrees at the moment of impact."
"Probable Cause:
The Board determines that the probable cause of this ac-
cident was the action of the pilot in making an instrument
let-down without previously establishing a positive radio
fix. This action was aggravated by conditions of severe
static, wind in excess of anticipated velocities, preoccupa-
tion with an unusual amount of radio conversation, and
the inoperative Newhall radio range."
The amount of evidence available is usually limited only
by the zeal and intelligence of the lawyer. Of course some of
our brethren do not want to have to use either zeal or intelli-
gence. They do not want both parties to have a fair hearing
as provided by our established law. They want liability arbi-
trarily imposed on the airline-or at least presumed against
the airline-so that all they have to do is thumb a code, like
looking up a telephone number, to find out what is due and
go collect. Fortunately, there have been enough thoughtful
lawyers, who respect the struggle during past centuries in
developing the protection of our present system, to block the
attempted radical departures from established law.
9
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Federal v. State Control of Tort Remedy
Another unjustified conclusion of the uninitiated or of the
legal reformer is that the airplane is inherently interstate in
character and, therefore, should have interstate or federal
regulation as to tort. The standard illustration is that a New
York-Washington, D. C., plane flies over six jurisdictions
in a matter of minutes: New York, New Jersey, Pennsyl-
vania, Delaware, Maryland and the District of Columbia. Of
course, this is quite true. Its truth has been recognized by
the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193824 which pro-
vides uniform safety and economic regulation, but the con-
clusion that tort liability regulation is also indicated is com-
pletely unjustified. For the federal government to usurp such
authority would be an unwarranted invasion of the right of
each sovereign state to control the remedy for tort committed
within its border. While there is somewhat different law in
the different U. S. A. jurisdictions, there has been no con-
flict and the applicable law is conveniently available to any-
one with access to a law library anywhere in the United
States. It is well established that the applicable law is that
of the place where the "force impinged" causing the injury,26
the lex loci delictus. To set the airplane apart for a different
standard of liability from competing forms of surface trans-
portation is not only a grave injustice to a new and strug-
gling industry, but is an unwarranted invasion of the right
of each state to control the happenings within its borders.
The states have very different ideas and this is inherent un-
der the theory of our Union. New York, like several other
states26 has a constitutional prohibition against limiting the
sum recoverable as damages for wrongful death, whereas the
state next door, Connecticut, like many other states, 27 chooses
to limit such recovery. Of course, the mere fact that an air-
24. 49 U. S. C. 401.
25. 1943 USAvR 1, 293 N. Y. 878, BEAL, CONFLICT OF LAw-Vol. 2,
129.
26. Constitutions of Arizona, Ark., Ky., N. Y., Ohio, Okla., Penna.,
Utah & Wyo. prohibit limiting recovery for wrongful death. Ariz., Ark.,
Ky., Penna. and Wyo. also prohibit any limitation upon recovery for
bodily injury or damage to property.
27. Alaska, $15,000; Col. $10,000; Conn. $20,000; 1l1. $20,000; Ind.
$15,000; Kansas $15,000; Maine $10,000; Mass. $15,000; Minn. $17,500;
Missouri $15,000; N. Hampshire $15,000; Oregon $15,000; S. D.
$10,000; Va. $15,000; W. Va. $10,000; Wisconsin $15,000. For com-
mon carriers only, New Mexico $10,000.
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plane crosses state boundaries faster does not make it any
more interstate in character than the railroads, buses, truck
lines, etc.
Common Law Has Adapted Itself to Aviation Readily
As a matter of fact, our courts have found no difficulty in
adapting the common law to aviation tort liability, as report-
ed to the New York State Bar Association by its Committee
on Aeronautical Law in 1942, when the writer was not a
member of that Committee. That Committee found, after an
examination of all available authority, that the courts had
found no additional law necessary to do substantial justice
to the public and all concerned. That conclusion was confirmed
in 1950, when the writer was Chairman of said Committee.
The final conclusion justified is that our presently estab-
lished common law, without the intervention of theoretical re-
formers or of special statutes, is best able to handle aviation
cases just as it does other types of cases, with greatest jus-
tice to all parties concerned. The average lawyer will find
that he can competently and with confidence prosecute an
aviation case on the basis of the law he already knows-muck
the same principles taught when I graduated from the Uni-
versity of South Carolina School of Law in 1910.
The Civil Aeronautics Authority and Its Regulations -
There is often some confusion as to (1) just whit the Civil
Aeronautics Authority is, and (2) as to the effect of the Civil
Air Regulations issued by that federal Authority on aviation
liability.
(1) The Civil Aeronautics Authority was created by the
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. Under the Reorganization Act
of 1939 the President reorganized the Authority and Public
Resolution 75, approved June 4, 1940, provides that Reor-
ganization Plans No. III and IV shall take effect on June 30,
1940. Briefly, the Civil Aeronautics Authority was divided
into two organizations, one being the Civil Aeronautics
Board, which, among other things, issues civil air regulations
and investigates accidents through its Safety Bureau, and
the other, the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, who, among
other things, is the administrative agency to carry out the
regulations of the Board. The term Civil Aeronautics Au-
11
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thority is now used only in referring generally to the whole
federal control of aeronautical affairs.
(2) There is presently no federal law (other than the War-
saw Convention) having to do with aviation liability to pas-
sengers, goods or the public. Section 701 (e) of the 1938 Act,
supra, specifically provided that no part of any report or the
investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used
in any suit or action for damages growing out of any matter
mentioned in such report or reports. This is only fair, as this
agency has nothing to do with determining liability, its in-
vestigations are for a totally different purpose-safety regu-
lation-it receives inadmissible evidence without regard to
the safeguards of law and its conclusions which may be in-
terpreted as affecting liability are often unsustainable by
legal evidence.
About the only way the civil air regulations of the CAB
would affect liability is that compliance with or violation of
regulations might be submitted as evidence, if material, in
legally determining liability. In other words, violation of
Civil Air Regulations and of local flight rules are not neces-
sarily negligence per se, but may be considered by the jury
as evidence of negligence when the violation is the proximate
and contributing cause of the accident.
28
Statutory Exceptions to Common Law Rules
I mentioned above three exceptions to the application of
the common law rules of liability respecting airplane tort lia-
bility:
(1) Land Damage Statutes; (2) Guest Statutes; (3) The
Warsaw Convention.
Land Damage Statutes
(1) Land Damage laws in a few states impose absolute
and unlimited liability on the owner (and certain liability
on the operator) for property damage and/or injury to in-
nocent third parties on the surface caused by the operation
of aircraft or objects falling therefrom. This appeared as
Section 5 of a model form known as the Uniform State Law
for Aeronautics promulgated to the states about 1922 before
there was any commercial aviation or any experience from
28. Braman v. Thomson, 139 USAvR 142, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 602.
204
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1951], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol4/iss2/2
AIRPLANE TORT LAW
aeronautics operations and while the airplane was an ob-
ject of fear and distrust within the definition of a dangerous
instrumentality. Of course, as soon as there was enough ex-
perience with aviation to judge as to its dangers, our courts
promptly and almost universally held the airplane not to be
a dangerous instrumentality but in the meantime, mostly in
the nineteen twenties, almost half the states had passed this
model bill. Most of them-including South Carolina-includ-
ed the antiquated and ill-conceived Section 5.
I describe this absolute liability provision as antiquated
because, as explained above, the airplane has proven itself
not to be a dangerous instrumentality and there is no justi-
fication for imposing upon it a different standard of liability
than that applicable to other forms of transportation. I de-
scribe it as ill-conceived because the absolute and unlimited
liability imposed upon the aircraft owner-regardless of
fault or his ability to prove that the injury or damage was
not caused of his own lack of care--is a definite detriment to
aviation and opposed to our precepts of justice to all parties
concerned. With such rigid liability absolutely imposed upon
him, the aircraft owner who really understands the situation
would not dare own an airplane without insurance for fan-
tastically high limits of liability.
If there was any real need for this drastic treatment, there
might be some justification for it. However, such legislation
is entirely unnecessary for the protection of the public as I
have been unable to find one single instance where any court
in states not having this legislation has failed to give ade-
quate relief to innocent third parties on the surface.29 This
is so thoroughly recognized that the states which originally
incorporated Section 5 into their law have been constantly
repealing this Section until by the end of 1950, there remain
only ten jurisdictions that retain the absolute liability pro-
vision: Delaware, Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Da-
kota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, Montana and Wy-
oming. Two methods have been used to repeal this law, one
illustrated by the action of South Dakota in 1949 that pro-
vides liability for such tort in accordance with the rules of
29. Guille v. Swan, 1928 USAvR 53; Rochester v. Dunlap, 1933
USAvR 511; Livingston v. Flaherty, 4 J. Am LAw 515; Pentz v. Rex,
1936 USAvR 294; Kirschner v. Jones, 1932 USAvR 278; So~lak v. State
of N. Y., 1929 USAvR 42.
13
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law applicable to torts in that state, and another, like the
Maryland law, which imposes presumed liability upon the
owner-making proof -of-damage prima facie evidence of lia-
bility-but permitting the aircraft owner the opportunity of
rebutting this presumption. Georgia, Maryland, Nevada, and
Wisconsin now have such laws.
Several legislatures have repealing laws before them dur-
ing 1951 but a record of final action is not yet available. Ver-
mont obviously attempted, to void the absolute liability pro-
vision of its law this year by deleting the word "absolutely"
and "whether such owner was negligent or not" from the
provisions creating liability on the owner of an aircraft for
damage or injury on the surface," but whether this was suc-
cessful is doubtful since the law still declares the owner li-
able and only the defense of contributory negligence is pro-
vided. I am hopeful that South Carolina will soon correct its
law-which I believe is Section 7104 in the South Carolina
Code-preferably by substituting the text of the South Da-
kota 1949 amendment. This law is suggested as it not only
corrects the liability so that the airplane operator is placed
on equal terms with other forms of transportation but also
provides for exempting the equity owner to assist in financ-
ing the purchase of airplanes. At present, the only relief giv-
en the equity owner against these absolute liability laws is
the attempt of the 80th Congress in passing Public Law 656,
Section 504 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193830 as
amended.
Guest Statutes
(2) Guest Statutes applicable to the aircraft have been
passed by a few states, notably South Carolina, California
and Indiana. Motor vehicle laws have been generally held
inapplicable to aviation and so the guest statutes in such laws
would naturally not apply. The Indiana law predicates lia-
bility only upon proof of wanton or wilful misconduct and
the California statute likewise limits liability definitely but
the South Carolina statute appears rather indefinite since it
predicates liability on intention on the part of the owner or
operator or his "heedlessness". 31 Just what a jury would con-
sider "heedlessness" seems problematical. The tendency ap-
30. 49 U. S. C. 401.
31. § 5908, 1936 Supp.
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pears to be to make guest statutes now applicable to automo-
biles also applicable to aviation, since several such bills are
in legislatures this year.
Warsaw Convention
(3) The third exception affecting airplane tort liability is
an international "Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air", com-
monly called the Warsaw Convention. 32 This treaty was ad-
hered to by the U. S. A. in 1934 and is in effect in most of the
nations in Europe, Canada and Mexico in North America and
only Brazil (with the exception of European dependencies)
in Central and South America. 32a
Its application is determined33 by the contract of transpor-
tation and not by the place of accident-when between two
nations adhering to the treaty, or from one adhering nation
to a destination in that same nation, if there has been an
agreed stopping place in another nation whether an adherent
or not. It places presumed liability on the carrier for injury
to passengers, 34 baggage and/or goods 35 unless the carrier can
affirmatively prove that it and its agents have taken all neces-
sary measures to avoid the damage 6 (or in the case of bag-
gage and goods, that the damage was caused by an error in
piloting or navigation37), and limits recovery: for death or
injury of passengers 38 to the present U. S. currency value of
$8,291.87; baggage and goods39 to $16.58 per kilogram
(2.2046 lbs.) ; and $331.67 for objects of which the passenger
takes charge himself 4o, unless the passenger affirmatively
proves that the damage was caused by wilful misconduct,41 in
which case there would be no limit. The limitation for bring-
ing an action is two years.42
32. 49 STAT. 300 (1934); available from Supt. of Doc., Washington
25, D. C. as Treaty Series No. 876, at 10 cents.
32a. 1950 USAvR Blue Pages.
33. Ch. I, Art. 1 (2).
34. Ch. III, Art. 17.
35. Ch. III, Art. 18.
36. Ch. III, Art. 20 (1).
37. Ch. III, Art. 20 (2).
38. Ch. III, Art. 22 (1).
39. Ch. III, Art. 22 (2).
40. Ch. III, Art. 22 (3); The U. S-. cy. value of the gold franc is
presently fixed at $0.066335.
41. Ch. III, Art. 25.
42. Oh. III, Art. 29.
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Our international air commerce is developing rapidly and
this development will continue until it becomes of importance
to an ever increasing number of lawyers. As a matter of fact,
the subject is not as remote in practical interest as appears
on the surface, as many lawyers who do not consider their
practice in the field of international law at all are being con-
fronted with the problems growing out of international air
transportation-and finding that quite different principles of
law are involved. This, of course, is in those cases to which
the so-called Warsaw Convention is applicable-and it can
be applicable in the most surprising places, for instance, on
a purely intrastate flight, let us say, from Greenville to
Charleston. 3
There have been several decisions of interest in connection
with the Warsaw Convention but I am afraid there is time
to discuss only one.
The Leading U. S. A. Warsaw Convention Case
The case of Wyman v. Pan American44 was concluded in
1945. This case involved the death of a passenger in 1938
on a passage contract from San Francisco (USA) to Hong
Kong (a British colony), both adherents to the Warsaw Con-
vention. The trip required several days with overnight stop-
overs at a number of points, all under U. S. sovereignty and
the accident occurred on the leg of the flight between Guam
and Manila, both under U. S. Sovereignty at that time. In
other words, the plane had never entered foreign territory
and the intended immediate destination, Manila, was still
under U. S. A. jurisdiction. Further, the plane disappeared
over the no-man's land of the high seas, so the accident or
whatever caused the failure to reach port, was assumed to
have occurred over the high seas. The many interesting legal
questions arising in such circumstances are immediately ap-
parent. The case was tried in the New York State Supreme
Court, New York County in June 1943, the decision being
that the flight was subject to the Warsaw Convention and
that recovery was limited to the U. S. equivalent of the limit
provided therein. The decision was unanimously affirmed
43. Orr, March, 1945, VA. LAw RaviEw, p. 423.
44. 1943 USAvR 1; 181 Mis. 963; 43 N. Y. S. 2d 420, 293 N. Y.
878.
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without opinion by the Appellate Division45 and again unan-
imously affirmed without opinion by the New York Court of
Appeals.4 6 Certiorari was denied by the United States Su-
preme Court, April 23rd, 1945.4
7
Since this is the first case involving the Warsaw Conven-
tion which has been considered by the highest state and fed-
eral tribunals, it will probably be classed as the leading
American case. In view of the many legal questions so ably
presented by counsel for both sides on the several appeals, it
is regrettable that we have no opinions from the higher
courts. However, Judge Schreiber's decision, so authoritative-
ly confirmed, settled several important points: (1) the rights
of the parties are fixed by the Warsaw Convention. (2) The
Convention becomes a part of the law of the land. (3) The
rules of the Convention were made a condition of the ticket,
(4) and in any event are so made by the Convention rules
themselves. (5) Warsaw Convention rules are applicable only
to international flights (Art. 1) and (6) raise a presumption
of liability on the part of the carrier (7) for injury or death
of a passenger (8) limited to approximately $8,300 under
present U. S. Gold standard, except where the carrier is guil-
ty of "wilful misconduct". (9) There was no proof of wilful
misconduct, indeed of any negligence connected with or a
proximate cause of the accident (establishing that affirma-
tive proof is necessary). (10) The Warsaw Convention rules
permit a recovery that otherwise might be impossible for
want of proof. (11) The original place of departure and the
final destination is specifically controlling despite breaks in
travel routes. (12) Compliance with the law (by the carrier)
is always to be assumed unless the contrary is proven. (13)
The right to bring a death action is purely statutory. It did
not exist at common law, and depends upon the existence of
the statute creating a right of action at the place where the
"force impinged" causing the injuries. (14) No new substan-
tive rights were created by the Warsaw Convention and all its
rules are well within the framework of existing legal rights
and remedies. (15) The right to recover must depend upon
some statute. (16) The New York Law can have no applica-
45. 267 App. Div. 947; 48 N. Y. S. 2d 459.
46. 293 N. Y. 878; 59 N. E. 2d 785; 1943 USAvR 1.
47. 324 U. S.-No. 1 (advance sheets), page V. Leading British case
Grein v. Imperial Airways; 1936 USAvR 184.
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tion as the injury and death did not occur within the state.
(17) The federal "Death on the High Seas Act ' 48 is appli-
cable to airplane accidents on the high seas. (18) As interest
is not provided in that Act, no interest may be allowed on
verdict.
Airplane Tariffs Filed With C.A.B.
While perhaps not strictly tort law, the tatiff rules and
regulations filed with the CAB in Washington and available
in all airline ticket offices, may have very definite effect on
both tort cases and claims for loss or damage to baggage and
cargo. The Civil Aeronautics Board is similar in some re-
spects to the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 requires that the airlines file a
tariff with the Board49 which includes rules and regulations
with regard to the value of baggage, right to cancel flights,
time in which notice of claim must be given, etc.
The legality and binding effect upon the passenger of such
regulations has been amply upheld in a number of suits.60
Rather tpical was the case of Meredith v. United Air Lines,
in which ear injury was alleged because of failure to main-
tain pressure in the passenger cabin, even though a pres-
surized cabin was warranted. Rule 17 (A) provided that no
action shall be maintained for injury or death of a passenger
unless notice is given in writing to the general office of car-
rier within 90 days after alleged occurrence and unless action
is commenced within one year. Motion for summary judg-
ment was granted, the court holding that airline passengers
are bound by conditions stated in the passenger tariffs on
file with the CAB and various airline offices. Such conditions,
although not appearing on the ticket sold to the passenger,
must be complied with respecting form of notice, time of
making claim and commencing suit.
48. Title 46, U. S. C. § 761.
49. Markham and Blair, The Effect of Tariff Provisiona Filed Under
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938. 15 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW & Co. 251
(1948).
50. Jones v. Northwest, 22 Wash. 2d 863, 157 P. 2d 728; Wilhelm v.
Northwest, 1949 USAvR 334; Brandt v. Eastern, 1948 USAvR 636;
Mack v. Eastern, 1949 USAvR 202; Lichten v. Eastern, 1948 USAvR
194, 1950 USAvR 80, 87 F. Supp. 691, just affirmed by U. S. Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, Docket No. 21829; Meredith v. United, 1951
USAvR 103.
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There are similar regulations limiting the value of bag-
gage to $100 unless a greater value is declared at the time
of checking same and an additional charge (10 cents per
$100 on domestic lines) paid.
Any Good Lawyer Can Handle Aviation Cases
I hope that tlhe above brief and very general treatment of
the law applicable to airplane torts will, if it does nothing
more, disabuse the minds of the average lawyers of the idea
that there is any great mystery attached to aeronautical liti-
gation. If I had the time I would attempt to strip the mystery
also from aviation. Suffice it to say that any energetic and in-
telligent lawyer can prepare an aviation case as easily, in
fact, more easily, that he can in any other technical field.
There is still no substitute for hard work and careful prepa-
ration, but where these elements are accepted and faithfully
discharged, I believe the average lawyer will find real inter-
est and pleasure in handling aviation cases and that he will
find himself quite capable of doing a good job.
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